Episteme
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Episteme, as distinguished from
techne, is etymologically derived from the
Ancient Greek word ἐπιστήμη for
knowledge or
science, which comes from the verb ἐπίσταμαι, "to know". In
Plato's terminology episteme means knowledge, as in "
justified true belief", in contrast to
doxa, common belief or opinion. The word
epistemology, meaning the study of knowledge, is derived from episteme.
Episteme in Western philosophy
The concept of episteme in Michel Foucault
The contemporary philosopher
Michel Foucault used the term
épistémè in a highly specialized sense in his work
The Order of Things to mean the historical
a priori that grounds knowledge and its
discourses and thus represents the
condition of their possibility
within a particular epoch. In subsequent writings, he made it clear
that several epistemes may co-exist and interact at the same time, being
parts of various power-knowledge systems. But, he did not discard the
concept:
I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic
apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements
which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a
scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is
possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which
makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of
what may from what may not be characterised as scientific.[1]
Foucault's use of
episteme has been asserted as being similar to
Thomas Kuhn's notion of a
paradigm, as for example by
Jean Piaget.
[2] However, there are decisive differences. Whereas Kuhn's
paradigm
is an all-encompassing collection of beliefs and assumptions that
result in the organization of scientific worldviews and practices,
Foucault's
episteme is not merely confined to science but to a wider range of discourse (all of science itself would fall under the
episteme
of the epoch). While Kuhn's paradigm shifts are a consequence of a
series of conscious decisions made by scientists to pursue a neglected
set of questions, Foucault's epistemes are something like the
'epistemological unconscious' of an era; the configuration of knowledge
in a particular episteme is based on a set of fundamental assumptions
that are so basic to that episteme so as to be invisible to people
operating within it. Moreover, Kuhn's concept seems to correspond to
what Foucault calls theme or theory of a science, but Foucault analysed
how
opposing theories and themes could
co-exist within a science.
[3] Kuhn doesn't search for the conditions of possibility of opposing discourses within a science, but simply for the (relatively)
invariant[disambiguation needed] dominant paradigm governing scientific research (supposing that
one paradigm always
is
pervading, except under paradigmatic transition). In contrast, Foucault
attempts to demonstrate the constitutive limits of discourse, and in
particular, the rules enabling their productivity; however, Foucault
maintained that though ideology may infiltrate and form science, it need
not do so: it must be demonstrated how ideology actually forms the
science in question; contradictions and lack of objectivity is not an
indicator of ideology.
[4] Kuhn's and Foucault's notions are both influenced by the French philosopher of science
Gaston Bachelard's notion of an "
epistemological rupture", as indeed was Althusser. More recently,
Judith Butler used the concept of episteme in her book
Excitable Speech, examining the use of
speech-act theory for political purposes.
See also
Notes
- ^ Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1980, p.197)
- ^ Jean Piaget, Structuralism (1968/1970, p.132)
- ^ Michel Foucault, L'Archéologie du Savoir (1969, ch. II.IV)
- ^ Michel Foucault, L'Archéologie du Savoir (1969, ch. IV.VI.c)
References
- Paul Stoller. The Taste of Ethnographic Things. 1989. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA.
- Foucault, Michel. L'Archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard. 1969.
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